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Part 2. The 'Technological Fix': Greening Industry and
Business

Chapter 4
Effects of Economic and Environmental Reform on the
Diffusion of Cleaner Coal Technology in China

Stephanie B. Ohshita and Leonard Ortolano

INTRODUCTION

Coa l is both the major fuel for China's econo mic development and the
major so urce of its severe air pollution. C hina's reliance on coal for nearly
three-qua rters of its primary energy has contributed to loca l air poll ution,
regional acid rain a nd global climate cha nge. At the same time, the country's coa l consumption has electrified its growing cities and helped Chinese
steel and chemical industries to become internationa l powerhouses.
This contribution considers how the intertwined issues of environmental
reform and economic reform have a ffected efforts to reduce coal-related air
pollution in China. Our analysis focuses on government efforts to promote the
diffusion of cleaner coal techno logies (CCTs) among industria l state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). We utilize a framework of 'fragmented a uth oritariani sm'
(Lieberth al and Oksenberg, 1988) fo r our investigatio n of CCT-related
policies, examinin g the cha nging relati onships among central a nd local
government actors and enterprises during the past decade of economic
reforms. We also examine how economic reforms have influenced environmental policy development at the centre, environmental policy implementatio n
at the loca l level, a nd the response of enterprises to these cha nging policies.
Fragmented authoritarianism helps explain why, despite government efforts to
promote technologies that reduce coal-related ai r pollutio n in C hina, the
diffusion of CCT has been slow.
We a rgue that the poor diffusion of CCT has been due to: ( I) conflicting
int erests in policy develo pment amo ng ce ntra l govern ment agencies; (2)
tensions between central a nd loca l governments in po licy implementat ion;
and (3) a lack of strong incentives for enterpri ses to adopt CCT. Although
so luti o ns to C hina's coa l-related pollution problems require integrated
planning of environmental , energy a nd economic policies, central government
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decisio n m a king on CCT is fragmented . Promoting the diffusion of CCT
requires acti ve involvement of loca l governments, but po licies do not yet
add ress the shifting ba la nce of power from central to loca l governments
which has been spurred by eco no mic reform. In addition , centra l government po licies fo r CCT have no t sufficiently considered the growing autono my o f SO Es no r the fin a ncia l pressures they fa ce from economic reforms.

Cleaner Coal Technology in China

T he terms 'clea n coal techno logy' a nd 'cleaner coal techno logy' encompass a
wide ra nge of equipment a nd methods a imed at reducing po llutio n from coal
prepa rati o n a nd utilizati o n.' Gi ven the d ominance of coa l in China 's do mestic energy mi x, CCT represents a pragm atic strategy fo r po llution reduction.
Broadly spea king, CCTs can be divided into four ca tego ries according to the
stage of coa l fl ow at which they a re applied : pre-combustion , co nversion,
co mbu stio n a nd post-combusti o n. Table I summa rizes the techno logies in
each category, a lo ng with their enviro nmenta l a nd energy o bjectives.
The p re-combusti o n techno logies in Table I include coa l washing, briq uetting a nd coa l- water mi xt ure (CWM) technologies. Coa l washing is the
most widespread fo rm of CCT in Chin a; briquettes fo r residential use are
a lso co mm o n. Am o ng co nve rsio n technologies, coa l gasification for the
productio n of town gas has been o n the increase in C hina and helps to
red uce loca l a ir po llutio n in cities. With nea rly 500,000 industria l boilers in
C hin a , improvements in combustion effi ciency could produce significa nt
enviro nmenta l benefits. Flue gas desulphurization (FGD) technology, often
referred to as a 'scrubber', is the ma in type of post-combustion CCT.
Fo r illustrati ve purposes, we focus o n two types of CCT in this contribution:
coa l washing, a pre-combustio n technology; a nd FGD, a post-combustion
techno logy. Coal washing has relati vely low costs and yields multiple environmenta l a nd energy conse rvati o n benefits by reducing the sulfur and ash
conte nt of coa l. However, was te water a nd sludge fro m coal washing mu st
be ma naged pro perl y to avoid se rio us water a nd land po llutio n problems.
Co mpa red to coa l washing, FGD techno logy has high sulfur rem ova l efficiency, but it is a n end-of-pipe po llutio n co ntro l techn o logy focused solely on
the rem oval of sulphur di ox ide (S0 2) . Adva nced FGD units ca n remove as
much as 99 per cent of S02 but units are costly a nd co nsume large amounts of
ene rgy a nd ma te ria ls. Capita l costs of FGD techno logy may be ten times
hig her th a n coa l was hing techno logy, and o perating costs a re two to three
times higher (CC P UA a nd E PRI, 2000).

I.

We use the term cleaner coa l techn o logy to emph asize tha t coa l-related poll utio n is
reduced , no t elimin a ted . Oth e r o pti o ns fo r address ing C h ina 's coa l-related
enviro nm enta l pro blems include re newable energy and energy efliciency.
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Table I. Coal Flow and Cleaner Coal Technologies
COAL FLOW

TYPE OF CCT

EXAMPLES

;:::
....,

OBJECTIVES

""
D

I:)

Pre-Combustion
Preparation

Coal Preparation

Briq uetting
Processing
Conversion
Co nversio n

Combustion
Combusti on

Post-Combustion
Pollutant Control

Ha nd ling

Coal washing, process contro l technology

Bio-briquettin g, co nventio na l ca rboniza ti o n
briq uetting
CWM with sulphur remova l

Remove debri s, ash (20- 50%), sulphur (40 - 50%);
improve coal quality a nd combustio n effici ency;
co nserve wa ter
Sha pe coa l fo r more efficient combu stion; inco rpora te
sulphur remova l agent
Improve ease of ha ndling; incorporate sulphur remova l
agent; CWM as o il alternative in indu strial boi lers
Liquefi ed coa l as an a ltern ati ve to o il
Ga sified coal as a n a lterna tive to na tural gas; reduce
residential po llutio n (by using coa l gas rather than
direct coa l combusti o n); improve effi cien cy a nd reduce
polluti o n fro m electric power ge neratio n
Improve effi ciency and reduce emi ssio ns of S0 2, NOx,
pa rticulates, volatile organics, etc. from metallurgical
a nd chemica l industries

Liquefaction
Gasificati on

Bitumino us a nd brown coal liquefacti on techno logy
Coa l gas fo r towns and cities, integrated gasificatio n
co mbined cycle power generatio n (IG CC)

Coking

Improved cokin g techno logy, adva nced pyro lysis
techn ology, o rga nic ch emica l production

High-effici ency
Combustion

Circul ating fluidi zed bed bo iler (CFB), CF B with
sulphur remova l, pressurized fluidi zed bed
co mbu sti on (PF BC)

Improve efficiency; reduce C0 2 emissio ns; red uce
emi ssio ns of S0 2, NOx, particul ates, a nd other
pollut a nts

Exhaust Gas
Treatment
Ash Utilizatio n

Flue gas deskulphurization (FGD), electrosta tic
precipitatio n (ESP)
Use of ash in fertilizer a nd bricks

Reduce emi ssions of S0 2 (75 - 99%) a nd pa rticula tes

~

~
;:::

0

0

~
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Q

S·
I:)

Reduce solid waste

No te: Technologies exam ined in thi s paper a re no ted in bold.
S ource: O hshita (2003 : 36) .
--.)
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The Fragmented Authoritarianism Model
For decades, Chinese scholars have used the 'fragmented authoritarianism '
model to help explain policy design and implementation within Chi na
durin g post-Mao economic reform s (see, for example, Lieberthal , 1992;
Lieberthal a nd Oksenberg, 1988; Wang, 1995). This model argues that,
despite views of C hina as a stron g, centrally-dominated developmental
state, decision-making power in much of the Chinese burea ucracy is di sjointed a nd fragmented . Th e mod el also hold s that th e fragmentation
is structura ll y b ased and ha s increa sed during th e reform period .
Conseq uently, ba rga ining has become increasingly important in efforts to
attain policy consensus. The followin g elements contribute to the fragmentation of a uthority within the C hinese administrative system:
• Organization of bureaucracies into hierarchical, functional systems
(xitong) with vertical reporting relationships known as tiao. This structure
a ll ows aut hority in a parti cular policy arena , such as environmental
protection, to fl ow vertically from the mini steria l level (such as the State
Environmental Protection Administration or SEPA) down through counterpart orga nizations (in thi s case, environmental protection bureaus or
E PBs) at lowe r levels.
• Territoria l or kuai reporting relationships in which a governmental
organizat ion at the sub-nationa l level reports to the local governmental
leadershi p at that level (for example, the reporting relationship of a
municipal E PB to the mayor of the municipality) .
• The bureaucratic ranking system , under which an agency with a pa rticular rank is unable to exert a uthority over other governmental organizations havin g the sa me or higher rank.
• Fiscal decentra lization , in which budgeta ry authority has devolved to
loca l levels thereby enabling many local burea ucratic units to acquire
'extra -budgetary funds. '
• Decentralized decision -makin g a uthority, in which the central govern ment has delegated increased respo nsibilities for decision making to
loca l governments a nd enterprises in a n effort to improve the economy.
The fragmented a uthoritarianism model has been most successfu lly used to
explain decision making in economic burea ucracies, pa rticula rly at the central
level government (Naughton , 1992). Bargaining behaviour resulting from the
fragmented struct ure of public ad ministration is most often observed when
tangible reso urces are invol ved (s uch as la rge investment projects) a nd there is
leeway in how a policy ca n be impl emented (Liebert hal, 1992: 18). Scholars
exa minin g agencies at loca l levels of government a nd in non-economic po licy
arenas have provided further nuance a nd highlighted the model's limitati ons.
For example, Walder (1992) emph asizes that barga ining between municipal
governments an d enterpri ses over financial fl ows stems no t so much from
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fragmentation of authority, but from efforts to reduce risks and provide
equitable resource distribution during the transition from central planning
to a socialist market economy. Manion (1992), in a study of personnel policy,
finds that if a policy is vague or inconsistent with other directives faced by
local government, it is unlikely to be implemented. This finding is supported
by research on environmenta l policy implementation in China (Ma and
Ortolano, 2000; Sinkule and Ortolano, 1995).
The fragmented authoritarianism model , along with some of its extensions
and critiques, has explanatory power for the case of CCT-related policy
design and implementation by China's environmental administration . Two
aspects of the model are particularly useful in analysing the diffusion of CCT:
the structure of bureaucratic authority; and changes in incentives that have
accompanied fiscal decentralization and enterprise deregulation. As we will
show, the outcomes of bargaining processes on a particular issue sometimes
yield policy inconsistencies with significant consequences for the ability to
diffuse CCT. We will also show that fiscal decentralization and enterprise
deregulation have given industrial SOEs incentives to prioritize profit maximization, which sometimes comes at the expense of investments in environmental protection . Moreover, because of their ability to extract greater extrabudgetary funds from enterprises, local governments have financial incentives
to prioritize economic development over environmental protection.
Subsequent sections of this contribution exa mine fragmented authoritarianism in the behaviour of three sets of actors pertinent to the diffusion of
CCT: central agencies, local governments and industrial state-owned enterprises. The fragmentation of a uthority for energy and environmental policy
among national ministries is discussed in detail in the next section. The
analysis then considers central- local government tensions in policy implementation, which relate directly to the decentralization of authority for
decision making in the fragmented authoritarianism model. The remaining
sections examine changing incentives for SOEs to adopt two types of CCT:
coal washing and flue gas desulphurization.

FRAGMENTED DECISION-MAKING AT THE CENTRE

Chinese central government decision making related to CCT is fragmented
and dispersed among severa l ministries and commissions. In the absence of
a single energy agency, the State Development and Plann ing Commission
(SDPC) led broad policies on energy pricing and the structure of energy
supply in the 1990s. 2 The Comm ission's policy is informed by the work of
2.

In 2003, SDPC was tra nsformed int o the Nationa l Development a nd Reform Co mmi ssio n
(NDRC). SETC was disbanded a nd its function s di stributed a mong NDRC and ot her
mini stri es. Supervision of industrial bureaus also shifted. We use SDPC a nd SETC in thi s
contribution to refl ect the names of the orga niza tio ns during o ur period of a nalysis.
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the Energy Research Institute (E RI), which is under SDPC control.
Decisions on indu strial structure and technology policy for energy-intensive
enterprises were led by the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
and by industry-specific state bureaus (sometimes referred to as administrations) under SETC supervision, such as the State Bureau of the Coal
Industry and the State Bureau of the Chemical Industry. Technology policy
was also under the purview of the Ministry of Science and Technology
(MOST), which promotes the acquisition, development, and dissemination
of technology in China. Policies affecting the price of coal or commodities
produced by coal-consuming enterprises must gain the approval of the State
Price Bureau and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Environmental policy
that could drive the adoption of CCT is the responsibility of the State
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA).
Jurisdiction over CCT-related policies shifted during the 1990s, with the
most significant changes occurring in 1998. The 1998 reforms sought to
address some long-standing problems of China's central government administration: the overlap of responsibilities and competition among agencies,
conflicts of interest caused by the mixing of government and business
functions, and inefficiency due to overstaffing and excessively large government offices (CESTT, 1998). The number of ministries and commissions
was reduced from forty to twenty-nine, and the number of staff was cut by
half withjn the following three-year period. The 1998 restructuring gave
prominence to environmental protection by elevating the former National
Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) to just half a rank below ministerial level. The former Environmental Protection Committee of the State
Council , which had often advocated different priorities than SEPA, was
disbanded (ERM China, 1998). While these were hopeful signs for
strengthening of environmental administration, economic commissions, planning commissions, and industrial bureaus continued to have stronger connections to enterprises and greater influence over enterprise technology adoption.
Administrative restructuring has reduced , but not eliminated, fragmentation of central government policy making on energy and environment. This
o utcome is particularly evident in the efforts of SEPA to implement a
programme of so2 fees that would give coal-consuming industries strong
incentives to reduce air pollution , through the adoption of production
process changes and end-of-pipe controls.

Tensions in Policy Development: The S0 2 Fee Programme
Since the beginning of the post-Mao period, China's
istration ha s advocated the collection of emission
discharging S02 and other pollutants in excess of
emission fees are set high enough, they can motivate
two ways. First, high fees can encourage enterprises

environmental adminfees from enterprises
national standards. If
pollution reduction in
to cut their emissions
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Table 2. Key Chinese Policies Promoting FGD and S0 2 Fees
Year

Policy

1982 Provisional Regulatio n o n
Collecting Fees fo r Polluta nt
Discharge
1987 Air Pollution Control Law
(origin al)
1988 Provisional Regulati o n on
Loa ns from Pollutant Fees
1992 Circul ar o n Trial Co llect ion
of S0 2 Fees
1995

1996

1997
1998

2000

Provisions Related to FGD and SO, Fees
Set S01 fees at 0.04 yuan per kg SO, em itted in excess
of standards.

Established SO, concentrati on standa rds; no specific
FGD requirements.
Allowed EPBs to loan po lluta nt fee money to
en terprises for po llution con tro l investments.
Launched trial coll ec tion of higher SO, fee s (0.2 yuan
per kg SO,) in Guangdong a nd Guizhou provinces
a nd in nine cities including Qingdao and Hangzho u.
Air Po llut ion Control Law
Revised requirements, with a focus on S0 2 contro l
(revised)
at power pla nts and large industrial enterprises;
ca lled for FGD if low-sulphur coa l was not used ,
but did not contain strict requirements for FG D.
Total Emissions Con tro l Policy Authorized NEPA to determine emission a ll ocat ions
for the provinces and to direct local governments to
use permits to establish emi ssion limits for en terprises
under their jurisdiction. Stricter limits increased the
need for FGD.
C hina Trans-Century Green
Pl ann ed twenty-seven FGD projects at power plants in
Project (Phase I , 1996- 2000)*
acid rain regio ns a nd cities wi th severe SO, pollution .
Two Con trol Zo nes Po licy
Formally established acid rain and air pollution
a nd Regul atio n on Thermal
contro l zo nes. Ca lled for FGD a t new power plants
burning coa l with S> 1% a nd raised fees to 0.2 yuan
Power Pla nt Emissions
per kg S0 2 for all no n-compliant enterpri ses in the
two co ntrol zones.
Air Po llution Control Law
Strengthened requirements for FG D at power plants.
(revised)

2002 Tenth Five Yea r Pla n for
Environmental Protection

Reinfo rced requirements for S0 2 contro l,
including FGD.

No te: *In the Ni nth Five Year Pla n for Environmental Protection and Long-Term Targets for
the Year 2010.

and meet national sta ndards because doing so eliminates the need to pay
fees. Second, revenues generated from emission fees can be used to subsidize
enterprise adoption of pollution control equipment through grants or lowinterest loan s. The evolution of the S02 fees policy and the promotion. of
FG D is shown in Table 2.
After some ea rly trials, fees on S0 2 and other polluta nts in Ch in a were
the subject of a 1982 regulation (State Council, 1982). The fee programme
was expanded in 1988, when EPBs began to make loans of po llutio n fee
money to support enterprises in installing pollution control eq uipment
(State Council, 1988). Notwithstanding these regulations, the effects of the
so2 fee programme were modest beca use the fees - 0.04 yua n (0.5 us
cents) 3per kg of so2- were much lower than the cost of installing and

3.

Conversion based on a typical 1998 exchange rate of 8.32 yua n/US$ I.
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operating control equipment. Enterprises found it cheaper to pay the fees
and keep polluting rather than control pollution .
During the 1990s, NEPA urged that S0 2 fees be increased, but the State
Council and other central government agencies resisted because of concerns
abou t economic development. Although the State Council's Environmental
Protection Commission supported the increase, it was opposed by both the
State Price Burea u and the Ministry of Finance.4 NEPA made a small advance
in 1992 when a fee of 0.2 yuan (2.4 us cents) per kg so2was approved on a
trial basis in two provinces and nine cities with severe air pollution (NEPA
et al. , 1992; State Price Bureau and Ministry of Finance; 2002).
NEPA's efforts to promote higher S02 fees and otherwise strengthen a ir
pollution control requirements were given a significant boost in 1997 and
1998 when Premier Zhu Rongji and the State Council were briefed on the
negative effects of air pollution on the economy. As one exa mple of the
economic costs of outdoor air pollution, Chinese researchers estimated th at
emissions of S02 and particulate matter caused an annual loss of 95 billion
yuan (US$ 11.4 billion) in terms of human health damages, a loss of 1.6 per
cent of GOP (Gao and Li , 1999: 145). A widely cited World Bank study
(1997) gave similar estimates. As a result of these and other economic
studies, China's top leadership became increasingly interested in attempting
to curb air pollution beca use of its adverse economic effects.5
Action came in January 1998, when the State Council approved NEPA's
plan on the 'Two Control Zones' for acid rain a nd air pollution control
(State Co uncil, 1998; SEPA, SDPC, et al. , 1998). The State Council's
approval aut horized the collection of so2 fees of 0.2 yuan per kg so2
beyond the 1992 trial areas. These fees were to be collected from enterprises
exceeding emissio n limits within the acid rain a nd air pollution control
zones (Minchener et al. , 1999: 561 ; State Council , 1998). The higher fees
have still not been widely implemented , however, even though they are
below the cost of installing and operating pollution control equipment,
because local officials a re concerned about possible adverse effects on the
eco nomy. 6 Loca l government resi stance to collection of S0 2 fees led SEPA
to issue another notice in 2000, emphasizing that the State Council had
approved the higher fees of 0.2 yuan per kg so2and that local governments
must collect them (SEPA , 2000).

4.

5.

6.

The fact that the Env ironmenta l Protectio n Commi ssio n supported SEPA's positio n is
noteworthy because the Commissio n (d isbanded in 1998) and SEPA (then NEPA) had
frequently disagreed on environmental priorit ies a nd projects. See Vermeer (1998: 977).
Based on interviews by S. B. Ohshita with two researchers advising the State Co uncil's
Na ti onal Reso urce and Environmental Protection Commit tee (headed by Qu Geping) ,
Beij in g, November 1998 a nd 1999.
Based on interviews by S. B. Ohshita with a seni o r SEPA official and three envi ro nmenta l
researchers advising SEPA, Beijin g, Novembe r 1998 and 1999; and with the ma nager of a
chemica l plant o perating FG D eq uipment , Shandong, Octo ber 1998.
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The struggle to implement the S0 2 fee programme illustrates how policy
negot iations among central government agencies with different priorities
resulted in weak policy signa ls and poor CCT diffusion. Without the higher
S02 fees advocated by SEPA, industrial enterprises had little incentive to
invest in CCT. Even after fees were raised , CCT diffusion was slowed
beca use of loca l government resistance to implementing centrally-issued
pollution control policies that were inconsistent with local development
goals.

CENTRAL-LOCAL TENS IONS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATIO N

Local implementation of centra l government policy - especially environmental policy - is crucial for the promotion of CCT. Local governments
are obliged to carry out central government environmental directives, but
they a lso have strong incentives to promote loca l eco nomic development
(Oi, 1999). This central- loca l tension is rooted in the organizational structure of China 's environmental bureaucracy. Figure I illustrates the relationships among central and local government agencies relevant to CCT policy.
Loca l EPBs report vertically to SEPA (t iao relationship), but must also
report horizontally to local industrial bureaus and planning commissions
(kuai relationship). The necessity of working with pro-development agencies
of local government can make it difficult for EPBs to achieve environmental
goa ls. Often local agencies promoting eco nomic development have larger
budgets, more staff a nd greater political strength than local EPBs. Mayors
o r ot her high-ranking loca l officials can a lso strongly influence EPB
activi t y. As a result, local agencies and leaders may win out over the EPB if
centra l environmenta l directives appear to conflict with local economic
objectives. 7
Economic reforms of the 1990s intensified central- local government tensions linked to CCT. Policies promoting CCT call for investment in new
technology by enterprises, especially SOEs. However, SOEs must have
approval of their supervising government agency to invest in CCT. As
more and more SOEs shifted from central government control to supervi sion by loca l governments, their financia l performance became increa singly important to local governments. China 's major tax reform in 1994,
which redistributed tax revenues between the central and local government ,
made local officials especially keen on en hancing their budgets.8 Because
they were allowed to keep a major portion of taxes from the enterprises they
controlled, local governments had incentives to increase enterprise profits.
7.
8.

Fo r furth er discussion, see Jahiel ( 1998); Ma ( 1997); Ma and Ortolan o (2000); Sinkule a nd
Ortola no ( 1995).
For details o n the 1994 tax refo rm, see Cao et al. (1999). For local government response to
ta x reforms, see Oi ( 1999).

82

Stephanie B. Ohshita and Leonard Ortolano

Figure 1. Central- Local Chinese Government Relations Pertinent to CCT
Policy in the 1990s

National Peoples Congress,
State Cou nci l

Provincial Planning
Commissions (DRCs)

Source: Authors, based on Ma a nd Ortolano (2000); Sinkule and Ortolano (1995). Names in
pa rentheses reflect post-2000 changes in admini strative structure.

The 1995 budget law gave local governments a further incentive to
improve the fi nancia l performance of enterprises under their supervision.
This law prohibited the central government from deficit financing its current
account and it required a ll levels of local government to have balanced
budgets (Cao et al. , 1999). The 1994 tax reform coupled with the 1995
budget law made loca l officials scrutinize enterprise investments more carefu lly, especially investments in techno logy like CCT that might not generate
a return during the loca l officials' term s of office. 9
In general, the 1990s econo mic reforms aimed at industrial SOEs significantly reduced the abi lity of unprofitable enterpri ses to rely on government
bailouts, and the reforms forced enterpri ses (a nd the loca l governments overseei ng them) to face ha rd budget constraints (Cao et al. , 1999; La rdy, 1998).
Because the reforms also made it more difficult for SOEs to access credit, they
di scouraged many SOEs fro m engaging in pollution control activities that
might red uce net revenues or require large loa ns. 10 The implication fo r CCT

9.

I0.

Beca use top- level loca l offi cia ls a re typi ca lly assigned to a pa rticul a r loca tio n fo r only a
few yea rs befo re bein g tra nsferred , they tend to prefer investments with paybacks durin g
t heir terms of o ffi ce. See a lso BECo n and PN L ( 1996).
Tightened mo netary po licy in 1993 decreased the rate of new loa ns to SOEs and subsequent ba nkin g refo rm s also made loa n cri teri a more stringent.
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adoption was that industrial enterprises only had incentives to adopt technologies that would enhance profits or improve their competitive advantage, such
as coal washing technology. Technologies with extremely high capital costs such as FGD - were not appealing, as they required hard-to-get loans.
The fragmentation of central government decision making pertaining to
environment and development thus ma kes it difficult for the central government to send consistent policy signals encouraging enterprises to adopt
CCT. Moreover, the impacts of reforms related to local budgets and supervision of state-owned enterprises have made both SOEs and the local
governments that supervise them reluctant to invest in CCTs unless those
technologies yield short-term profits.

CONFLICTING PRIORITIES, WEAK INCENTIVES: THE CASE OF FGD

This section examines how fragmented a uthoritarianism affected the diffusion of FGD, as dispersed decision making and agencies with rival objectives restricted the promotion of FGD. This case also shows that expensive,
end-of-pipe pollution control technology is ge nerally at odds with the
economic interests of enterprises and local governments.
During most of the 1990s, China 's central government did not have a
consistent policy position on FGD. By 1998, when SDPC and the State
Coal Bureau fina lly backed SEPA's push for FGD, economic reforms had
diminished the ability of the central agencies to control local decision
making, and local governments were not inclined to encourage investments
th a t decreased enterprise profits. Consequently, FGD technology
experienced limited adoption by Chinese power plants and almost no adoption by industrial enterprises.
With S0 2 emission levels rising and a ir qua lity worsening, NEPA (and
later SEPA) determined that its goals for emission reduction and ambient
air quality could not be met without strong controls such as FGD. NEPA's
FGD requirements focused on power plants beca use they are the largest
individual so urces of S0 2• 11 Moreover, the contribution of electric power
plants to total emissions of S02 in China has been growing. Between I 990
and 2000, so2emissions from thermal power plants grew from 25 to nearly
50 per cent of the national total. 12
Policies promoting FGD bega n with the I 995 re vision s to the Air
Pollution Con trol Law and subsequent S02 concentration standards (see
Table 2 above). The push for FGD became stronger with NEPA's I 996
'Total Emi ss ion s Co ntrol Policy', which called for provinces and lower
II . SEPA's emph asis on FGD fo r power plants is simi lar to the approach for S0 2 control in
ot her count ries.
12. Emissions stati stics from SE PA ( 1998b). For details on this estimate, see Ohshita (2003:
Ch 9).
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levels of government to control the total amount of so2and other polluta nts by issuing emission limits on individual so urces. Control of total
emiss ions heightened the need for FGD at large emission so urces like
power pla nts, but beca use of weak implementation of the total emissions
control requirements, only a few FGD units were adopted.
The C hina Tra ns-Century Green Project (Phase I, 1996 - 2000), part of the
Ninth Five Year Pla n for Environmental Protection and Long-term Targets
for the Year 20 I 0, identified twenty-seven FG D projects to be undertaken
in areas affected by acid ra in a nd urban areas with severe air pollution
(NEPA et a l. , 1997). Although the Tra ns-Century Green Project also called
for FGD at large industria l enterprises, no specific projects were listed. With
the approva l of NEPA's 'Two Control Zones' policy by the State Co uncil
and the iss ua nce of new ther mal power plant so2sta nd a rd s in 1998, the
regu latory push fo r FGD at power pla nts was strengthened. The 1998
regul ation s required FGD at new power pla nts burning coal with sulphur
content above 1 per cent. However, the regulations did not explicitly require
FGD at existing power pla nts or large industrial enterprises. Local governments were given discretion to decide whether ex isting enterprises should
install FGD.
NEPA's promotion of FGD was resisted by both industry a nd government , beginning with other centra l government agencies during the policymaking process. The Ministry o f Finance, SDPC, SETC and the former
Mini stry of Electric Power wielded greater bureaucratic power than NEPA;
when differences emerged , the o ther mini stries usually got their way in
policy decisions. In the case of high-cost FGD, there was ten sion between
NEPA's pollution control goals a nd SDPC's economic development o bjectives. NEPA's desire to cut p ower plant S0 2 emissions with FGD also
conflicted with effo rts of SETC and the former Ministry of Electric Power
to rapidly expand electric power production during the 1990s (Vermeer,
1998). Unlike some other cleaner coal technologies, FGD lowers profits by
rai sing capital a nd operating costs. Flue gas desulphurization was also at
odds with SDPC and SETC energy efficiency goals, as FGD operation
consumes large quantities of energy.
The limited support for FGD that eventually emerged during the 1990s
can be attributed to the small area of overlap between NEPA's goals and
those of other central government agencies. Estimates of the costs of p ollution damage indicated that SDPC o bjectives for macro-economic development wo uld be served by some level of S02 control, including FGD. Flue
gas desulphurization would a lso enable new power plants to fire readily
available domestic coa l rather than expensive and less-a bundan t natura l
gas; the coal option was favo ured by SDPC, SETC an d the former
Mini st ry of Electric Power. 13 But SDPC estimates of FGD cost led it to
plan for FG D at only one-qua rter of new power plants in the Ninth F ive
Year Pl a n, not for all new plants as N EPA had suggested (US Em bassy
Beiji ng, 2000).
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From the perspective of Chinese state-owned enterprises, FGD is unappealing in terms of economics, operations and management. FGD can
increase capital costs of a new power plant by 15 to 20 per cent, and it
has high operating costs (Ohshita and Lu, 1996: 41 ). For industrial enterprises outside of the power sector, cost increases can be even more dramatic.
Because it is an end-of-pipe pollution control device, FGD offers no process
benefits. Operation is complex, maintenance is demanding and re-use or
disposal of waste sludge is problematic. Furthermore, FGD technology is
not available domestically and must be imported, which requires identifying
foreign vendors, obtaining foreign credit, completing tedious customs procedures, and working around language barriers during training. Economic
reform pressures on SOEs to improve financial performance have only
intensified enterprise resistance to FGD. In short, enterprises are not likely
to adopt FGD if they can avoid it (Ohshita and Ortolano, 1999, 2002).
Even when forced to adopt FGD by regulation , Chinese SOEs have had
difficulty obtaining the necessary funds to purchase and operate the equipment. During the 1990s, little financing was available domestically.
Government investment in FGD was small and banks were generally
unwilling to provide loans for pollution control equipment as expensive as
FGD. The S02 fee programme did not generate NEPA's desired level of funds
for investment in air pollution control equipment, because the fee level
was low and (as described above) fees were not collected regularly by EPBs.
The limited diffusion of FGD that did occur in China during the 1990s
was accompli shed primarily with concessional financing. The World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank and the Japanese government have been the
main sources of capital funds for FGD at Chinese power plants (Evans,
1999). Japan's Green Aid Plan appears to be the only source of foreign
financing for FGD at Chinese enterprises outside the power sector (Ohshita,
2003; Watson , 2002). With FGD requirements in the 2000 revisions to the
Air Pollution Control Law, and another surge in power plant construction
in 2004, cond itions for wider diffusion of FGD equipment in China are
beginning to emerge. Today, most equ ipment is made domestically and costs
have dropped to 400 yuan/kg.

CHALLENGES IN CO-ORDINATlNG ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORM: THE CASE OF COAL WASHING

Despite government efforts to promote coal washing, the production of
washed coal in China experienced ups and downs during the 1990s. This
was the result, in part, of dispersed bureaucratic decision-making structures

13 . Chinese energy policy began to pro mote use of natural gas in the late 1990s, but coal -fired
power plants are still seen as a sho rt-term necessit y.
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and difficulties in co-ordinating economic and environmental reforms. Our
examination of coal washing technology highlights the difficulties of creating timely incentives for technology adopters during periods of dynamic
reform , such as coal pricing liberalization and coal industry restructuring.
The incentives for Chinese coal mines to adopt and utilize coal washing
technology were strongly influenced by these economic reforms.

Coal Industry Restructuring and Coal Pricing Reforms
China 's coal mining industry has been characterized by four main ownership types: large state-owned mines (managed by the central government
until 1998); small- and medium-sized state-owned mines managed by local
governments; small, rural collective mines (mines that are township and
village enterprises, or TVEs); and private mines (lEA, 1999b; Thomson,
1996). The latter two types are often referred to as non-state mines. Figure 2
presents trends in coal production by these four types of mine ownership. In
the early 1980s, more than half of China's coal was produced by the large,
centrally-managed state-owned mines. Poor performance of the coal industry in the 1980s, accompanied by coal and electricity shortages, prompted
the central government to relax ownership restrictions and encourage TVEs
and other types of owners to expand production (lEA, 1999b). As a result,
Figure 2. Chinese Coal Production by Ownership Type
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growth in Chinese coal production from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s
came primarily from non-state mines.
Energy, particularly coal, was one of the last factors of production to be
released from strict central planning by the Chinese government. Until the
early 1990s, coal prices were controlled by the government and kept low in
order to spur economic growth and prevent hardships for residents using
coal for heating and cooking. While this policy benefited coal consumers, it
caused the coal mining industry to become the largest loss-generating
industrial sector of the Chinese economy (Rawski, 1994).
As a first step in coal pricing reform, in 1993 the central government
established a dual pricing system, whereby state-owned mines sold at a low,
government-controlled price, and township and vi ll age mines sold at a
market-determined price (lEA, 1999a: 104). As market prices rose to nearly
twice the artificia lly low state price, state-owned mines continued to experience heavy losses; nearly 90 per cent of state-owned mines reported losses in
1993 (lEA, 1999b). The dual-pricing system also generated a great deal of
corruption as low-priced state coal was illegally sold at higher market rates
(Thomson, 1996).
In 1994, state-owned mines were allowed to sell a portion of their coa l on
the market. Despite this change, 72 per cent of state-owned coal mines still
lost money in 1996, prompting the centra l government to liberalize all coal
prices. With coal in high demand domestically and international oil prices
boosting coal prices, many large state-owned mines began to move into the
black in 1997 (l EA, 1999b).
The 1997 rise in coal prices was short-lived, however. The Asian financial
crisis, coupled with Chinese domestic economic changes, led to an unexpected downturn in coal demand . After decades of demand exceeding
supp ly, China experienced a coa l glut. The small collective mines were
most immediately affected , and their prod uction fell the same year. The
decline in demand was accompanied by a drop in coal prices in early 1998.
As losses began to mount, the government announced an overhaul of the
coa l industry. The ninety-four large state-owned coal mines were transferred
from central to local management, mostly to the provincial level. The 2,500
smaller mines owned by local governments were directed to improve efficiency. Of the 75 ,000 sma ll mines run as TYEs, 25 ,800 were slated for
closure in an effort to balance supply and demand, improve the overall
efficiency of the industry, and reverse the drop in coal prices (lEA , 1999b ). 14
At the end of 2001 , coal prices finall y began to rise and the state-owned
mining sector as a whole began to generate profits again (Xinhua News
Agency, 2002). Increa sed demand for Chinese coa l exports and an upturn in
14. The central government 's effo rt s to close small mines, for bo th economic and
environ ment al rea so ns, have met with loca l resistance, as the minin g indu stry is o ne of
th e la rgest employers in C hina. Closed mines continue to be re-o pened illega lly. a problem
SEPA ( 1998a) refers to as "glowin g embers re-ki ndling'.
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domestic demand helped the industry. Continuing efforts to restrict sma ll
non-state mines reduced excessive supply a nd generated some improvements
in coal quality and mining safety. However, a 2004 surge in domestic and
international demand has again raised safety and quality challenges for
Chi na's coa l industry (AsiaPulse News, 2004).

Policies P romoting Coal Washing

Table 3 sum ma rizes key C hinese policies promoting coa l wash ing technology during the 1990s. In 1994, the former Ministry of the Coal Industry
announced its goa ls for expa ndin g the use of CCT, including coal washing
techno logy (Zhu a nd Yu , 1999). Promotion of coal washing in 1994 coincided with the secon d year of th e du a l pricing sys tem for coa l and th e
Ministry's efforts to improve coal qua lity and the profitabi lity of large
state-owned mines. In 1995, rev ision s to the Air Po ll ution Control Law
also encouraged adoption of coa l washing technology a nd the use of washed
coa l by industrial enterprises (H ao, 1996). In 1996, NEPA, with approval by
the State Council , began a drive to decrease production of low quality coal

Table 3. Key Chinese Policies Promoting Coal Washing
Year

Policy

Provisions Related to Coal Washing

1994

CCT Pla n

1995

Air Po llution Control Law (revised)

1996

' 15 Smalls' Policy

1997

N inth Five Yea r Pl a n fo r Chinese
Clea n Coa l Tec hn o logies a nd
Development Progra mme to the
Yea r 20 10
Ninth Fi ve Yea r Pl a n fo r
Enviro nmental Pro tectio n and Lo ngterm Ta rgets fo r the Yea r 20 I 0
C hina Tra ns-Century Green Project
(Phase I, 1996-2000)

Ministry of Coal Industry announced its CCT
Plan, including coa l washing.
Enco uraged coa l washing and use of washed
coa l by indu strial enterpri ses.
Ca lled fo r the closure of small mines, many
wi th high-sulphur coal ; red uced competition
ca n help improve adoption of coal washing
techn ology by medium and la rge mines.
Coal washing identified as one of fo urteen
techno logies; viewed as fundamental CCT
fo r China.

1997
1997
1998

Two Co ntro l Zo nes Po licy fo r Acid
Rain a nd Sulphur Dioxid e Contro l
(i ncluding so2fees)

2000

Air Po lluti on Cont rol Law (revised)

2002

Tenth Five Yea r Pla n for
Environmenta l Pro tecti o n

Called for coal washing as one of severa l
meas ures to control S0 2 and particu late matter
air po llutio n.
Co nta ined a few coa l washin g project s,
representing a sma ll subset of the national
CCT pla n.
Ba nned th e opening of new mines with coal
having > 3% sulphur; restricted existing mines
with >3% S; ca lled fo r new or expa nding mines
with > 1.5% S to insta ll coa l washing
techn ology; ca lled fo r ex isting mines with
> 1.5% S to ado pt coa l washing in stages.
Rein fo rced requirements for S0 2 co nt ro l,
including coa l sulphur restric ti o ns.
F urther pro moted coa l washing, as we ll as fuel
swi tching.
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by closing sma ll non-state mines (State Co uncil , 1996). Targets for growth
in coal washing appeared in 1997, as part of the Ninth Five Year Pl an (Du
and Liu, 1999). From a coal washing rate of roughly 25 per cent in 1995, the
central government planned to increase the rate to 30 per cent by 2000 and
to reach 40 - 50 per cent by 2010 (JCOAL, 1998).
The strongest policy push for coal washing carne in 1998, when the State
Council approved SEPA's Two Control Zones policy (State Council , 1998;
SEPA, 1998b). The policy required new and existing mines in the acid rain
control zone and the air pollution control zones to ado pt coal washing
technology based on the sulphur content of mined coal. Local governments
were forbidden to issue permits to proposed new mines whose coa l sulphur
content would be above 3 per cent. Existing mines with a coal sulphur
content greater than 3 per cent were to be closed or have their production
restricted. As deta iled in Table 3, requirements for mines with lower coal
sulphur content were less strict.
Policies promoting coal washing reflect increased co-ordination by central
government agencies in response to their overlapping economic, energy a nd
environmental interests and objectives in the late 1990s. When coal pricing
liberalization and coal industry restructuring encountered an unexpected
downturn in coal demand , the economic and industry ministries gave pri ority to the promotion of coal washing a nd closure of small non-state mines,
which was consistent with SEPA's efforts to curb coal-related ai r pollution.
As shown below, coal washing increased as the different priorities of centra l
gove rnment agencies became more closely ali gned and burea ucratic coordination improved. The trend in coal washing during the 1990s points to the
benefits of co-ordinating economic and environmental reforms, so as to create
consistent policy signa ls and incentives to which enterprises can respond.

Incentives and Barriers to Coal Washing
China met some of its goals for coal washing during the 1990s: in percentage
terms, it achieved its target of 30 per cent by 2000. But the production of
washed coal in abso lute terms (Mt/year) did not reach levels hoped for by
Chinese officials. Figure 3 illustrates trends in the production of washed
coal, based on data from China's large state-owned mines (LBNL, 2004).
Coking coal is the dominant form of washed coal, and is used by the iron
and steel secto r. A smaller share of washed steam coal is used mostly by
electric power plants (CCPUA and EPRI , 2000: 3- 10). Between 1980 and
1990, the production of washed coal at large state-owned mines rose slowly,
encouraged mainly by government subsidies and directed by central planni ng. After a slight dip in 1991 and 1992, production rose in 1993, coinciding with the liberalization of coal prices. In 1997, washed coa l production by
the la rge mines reached an all-time high. In 1998 a nd 1999, production of
washed coal fell sharply, following declines in export and domestic demand ,
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Figure 3. Producrion of Washed Coal By Large State-Owned Mines
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Source: LB L (2004: Table 28.1 0); AsiaPulse News (2002, 2004); Xinhua News Agency (2002).

as well as the drop in coal prices. By 2000, the production of washed coa l
was on the rise again , and by 2002 productio n had surpassed the 1997 peak.
The price that mines are able to charge for washed coal is a key determinant in their decision to adopt a nd operate coal washing technology. While
coal prices va ry substantially in China depending on the destination of the
coal , with transportation costs acco unting for as much as 70 per cent of the
delivered price (World Ba nk , 1997), we can make a few generalizations.
When coal prices were depressed , as they were before the 1996 price liberalization and during the 1997- 99 glut, the price differential between washed
a nd unwashed coal was substa ntia l. For example, when the run-of-mine
price for unwashed coal (that is, the price of coal at the mine, before
transport and delivery) was around I 00 yuan (US$ 12) 15 per ton, the price
of washed coal was an additional 50 yuan (US$ 6) per ton (CCPUA and
EPRI , 2000). Thus the run-of-mine price for washed coal was 50 per cent
hig her than the price for unwashed coal. In terms of the price of delivered
coal, which is the price most directly experienced by the coal consumer, the
difference is smaller but still notable: prices for delivered washed coal were
I 0 to 20 per cent higher tha n those for unwashed coal.

15.

Co nve rsion based on a typica l 1998 excha nge rate of 8.32 yuan/US$ I.
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Demand for washed coal - another determinant in a mine's decision to
adopt and operate coal washing technology - has been strong in the steel and
electric power sectors, but generally weak in other industrial sectors. Many
industrial enterprises were unable to use washed coal because they had outmoded boiler technology (CCPUA and EPRI, 2000; Fang et al. , 1999). In
addition , enterprises that were not pressed to meet so2standards may not
have felt the need to pay I 0 to 20 per cent more for washed coal. As a result,
demand for washed coal was generally low outside the steel and electric utility
sectors, and many mines were not able to charge enough to cover the additional
production costs for washed coal, especially washed steam coal (JCOAL, 1998).
Mines that did have incentives to operate coal washing facilities during
the 1990s were primarily large state-owned mines producing relatively high
quality coal for export or for sale to domestic steel plants and electric
utilities. In contrast to these large mines, the many small and medium-size
coal mines in China had weaker incentives: small Chinese mines operate at a
low technological level and cannot take advantage of economies of scale. 16
In general, small mines produce low quality coal and sell it locally; they do
not compete in higher-priced export markets. Because of their size, small
mines tend to sell to small enterprises that are Jess likely to purchase washed
coal. With limited technical resources, modest finances and limited demand
for washed coal, small mines generally did not adopt coal washing technology during the 1990s. Recognizing the weak incentives and capabilities at
small mines, some researchers have suggested that local governments should
support the construction of centralized coal washing facilities that use
simple technology (Ohshita , 2003).
The promotion of coal washing was thus affected by fragmented decision
making in the Chinese bureaucracy. While there was a trend toward greater
co-ordination among centra l government agencies, and although the interests of economic, industrial and environmental ministries were increasingly
overlapping at the end of the 1990s, decentralization made it more difficult
for the centre to push its agenda at the local level. Data on coal washing
how that production of washed coal became more closely linked with the
market as the reforms progressed . As coal pricing reform and coal industry
restructuring changed incentives for state-owned mines, the decisions of
mines and local government to produce washed coal became more heavily
influenced by economic signa ls. Coal washing is likely to increase as industria l modernization enables more enterprises to improve their combustion
technology and realize the benefits of washed coal. However, as long as
small mines and small industrial coal consumers continue to exist in large
numbers, technologies and implementation efforts targeted at small-scale
enterprises will be needed to realize widespread air quality benefits.

16.

Thi s was emphasized in a uth o r interviews with o fficials at the C hina Coa l Resea rch
Institute, Beijing, November 1998 a nd 1999. See a lso Smil ( 1989, 1998).
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CONCLUS IO NS

China 's experience with CCT demonstrates some degree of greening of the
C hinese state, whilst highlighting that significant effort is stilled needed to
reconcile environmental protection with economic development. Policies on
the closure of small coalmines a nd limits on coal sulphur content are
positive examples of co-ordination of central government plans for energy,
environment and economic development - consistent with a 'win- wi n'
ecologica l modernization paradigm . In contrast, fragmented authority of
cen tral government agencies during policy formulation on so2 fees contributed to the poor diffusion of FGD. Improved co-ordination among
central government agencies can provide clear and consistent signa ls to
both local officials and enterprises. Linking economic policies with environmental goals can promote adoption of cleaner technology by emphasizing
economically-favourable approaches (for example, improved fuel quality
a nd energy efficiency) that simultaneously reduce energy-related pollution
and promote economic development.
The CCT experience also shows that central agencies have encountered
difficulties with policy implementation and enforcement by local governments. As a consequence of economic reform s during the 1990s, especially
the imposit ion of hard budget constraints a nd increased market liberalization, loca l govern ments prioritized improving the economic performa nce
of the enterprises in their jurisdiction. Enforcement of environmental policies generally received lower priority. This difficulty with enforcement has
two implications. First, loca l government leaders need incentives that
reward them for implementing national environmenta l policies. Such incentives could be provided , for example, by changing the tax treatment of
investments in clea ner technology, or by increasing the emphasis on environmental achievements within C hina 's formal sys tem for evaluating the
performance of government officials. Second, central government intervention is sti ll needed to cou nter ma rket signa ls that lead to actions with
negative environmenta l impacts.
Finally, the greening process is on ly beginning to extend to C hinese
industry. To improve the diffusion of CCT, regulatory incentives for enterprises need to be a ugmented. During the 1990s, low emission fees and weak
implementation of some ai r pollution control requirements provided little
motivation for enterprises to invest in CCT. T his could change by increasing
so2fees to levels that are compa rable to the costs of installing and operating equipme nt wit h lower em iss ion s. In ad dition , domesti c financing
packages (such as tax breaks and low-interest loa ns) could spur investmen ts
in pollution control by enterprises, and encourage further development of
enterprises that manufacture low-cost CCT eq uipment within China. Wider
di ssemin ation of information on the economic benefits of cleaner coal
technol ogies could a lso promote technology diffusion and ecologica l modernization among Chinese enterprises.

Cleaner Coal Technology in China

93

Acknowledgements
The research on which this contribution is based was supported financially
by the US National Science Foundation, the UPS Foundation, the John D.
and Katherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Stanford University 's
Institute for International Studies. The authors are grateful for fie ld
research assistance from the Environmental Engi neering Department of
Tsinghua Un iversity and the Beijing Environment and Development
Institute of the People 's University in China, as well as assistance from
the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the New
Energy and Indu strial Technology Development Organization. We also
wish to acknowledge invaluable assistance from Mara Warwick in sorting
thro ugh Chinese regulations and government restructuring.

REFERENCES
Asia Pulse News (2002) ' Profile: China 's Coal Industry', Asia Pulse News 16 October.
AsiaPulse News (2004) ' Profile: Ch ina 's Coal Industry', Asia Pulse News 6 October.
BECon a nd PNL (1996) ' Energy Efficiency Opportunities in China: Industrial Equipment and
Small Co-Genera tio n'. A report by the Beijing Energy Efficiency Center (BECon) and
Pacific Northwest Labs (PNL), PNL-10252. Available online: http: //www.pnl.gov/china/
oppo rtun .pdf (accessed September 2002).
Cao, Y. , Y. Qian, a nd B. R. Weingast (1999) 'From Federalism, Chinese St yle, to Privatizati on,
C hinese Style', Economics of Trans ilion 7( I): I03 - 31.
CC PUA a nd EPRJ (2000) 'Technology Assessment of C lean Coa l Technologies for C hin a:
Volume 2 - Environmental and Energy Efficiency Improvements for Non-power Uses of
Coa l'. Report prepared by the China Coal Processing and Utilization Association (CCPUA)
with the assista nce of the US Electric Power Resea rch Institute (EPRJ), February.
C ESTT (1998) ' Environmentally Sound Technology in China ' , CESTT Newsle/ler. Beijing:
Cen tre for Environmentally Sustainable Technology Transfer (February).
Du, M ., and C. Liu ( 1999) 'The Commercializa tion of Clean Coa l Technology and Policy
Support', in B. Zhang and W. Fan (ed s) 2"'1 Inc '/ Symposium on CCT, pp. 98- 104. Beijing:
C hina Coa l Industry Publishing House.
ERM China ( 1998) The Suae Environmental Prolection Adminismaion: A New Environment in
Governme111? Beijing: ERM China.
Evans, P. C. ( 1999) Cleaner Coal Combustion in China: The Role of /11/emational Aid and Exporl
Credi!s fo r Energy Developme/11 & Environmental Pro tection. / 998- 1997 . Ca mbridge, MA:
Center for Internationa l Studies, MIT.
Fang, J. , T. Zen g, L. I. S. Yan g, K. A . Oye, A. F. Sarofim and J. M . Beer (1999) ' Coa l
Utilization in Industrial Boilers in C hina: A Prospect for Mitigating C0 2 Emissio ns',
Applied Energy 63(1 ): 35 - 53.
Gao, Y. and W. Li ( 1999) 'Coa l Demand a nd Supply a nd the Enviro nmenta l Impact from Coa l
Utili zation in C hin a ' , in B. Zhang and W. Fa n (eds) 2"'1 Int'l Symposium on CCT, pp. 143 57. Beijing: C hina Coa l Industry Publishing Ho use.
Hao, J. (1996) ' Environmental Po licies a nd Energy Use', in S. B. Oh shi ta a nd Y. Lu (eds)
Economic Groll'ih , Energy Use and Environmen!al Issues, pp. 34- 35 . Beijin g: C hin a
Environmental Science Press.
l EA ( 1999a) World Energy Outlook 1999 ( Looking at Energy Subsidies: Gelling the Prices
Right ) . Paris: Internati o nal Energy Agency.

94

Stephanie B. Ohshita and Leonard Ortolano

l EA ( 1999b) 'Coal in the Energy Supply of China '. A report of the Coal Industry Advisory
Board, Asia Committee. Paris: International Energy Agency.
Ja hiel , A. ( 1998) 'The Organization of Enviro nmental Protection in China ', in R. Edmonds
(ed.) Managing the Chinese Environment , pp. 33 - 63 . Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press.
JCOAL ( 1998) Chugoku ni Okeru Kondo no Sentan Gijutsu no Doukou Chosa (Future Trends in
Coal Preparation Technology in China). Tokyo: New Energy and Industrial Technology
Development Organization.
Lardy, N. ( 1998) China 's Unfinished Economic R evolution . Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institutio n.
LBNL (2004) China Energy Dawbook ( version 6.0) . Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Berkeley Nationa l
Laborato ry, Universit y of Ca lifo rnia.
Lieberthal , K. ( 1992) ' Introductio n: The " Fragmented Authoritarianism" Model and Its
Limitations', in K. Lieberthal and D. Lampton (eds) Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision
Making Post-Mao China, pp. l- 32. Berkeley, CA: Universi ty of California Press.
Lieberth a l, K. and M. Oksenberg ( 1988) Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures, and
Processes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ma, X. (1997) ' Contro llin g Indu strial Water Pollution in Chin a: Compliance in the Co ntext of
Economic Transition' . PhD dissertation , Stanford University.
Ma, X. and L. Ortolano (2000) Environmental Regulation in China. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Ma nion, M . ( 1992) 'The Behaviour of Middlemen in the Cadre Retirement Policy Process', in
K. Lieberthal and D. Lampton (eds) Bureaucracy, Politics. and Decision Making Post-Mao
China, pp. 2 16- 44. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Minchener, A. J. ( !999) ' Low Cost Ro utes for Improving Coa l-Based Energy Efficiency and
Environmenta l Performance', in B. Zhang and W. Fan (ed s) 2"" ln t'l Symposium on CCT,
pp. 129 - 42. Beijing: C hina Coa l Industry Publishing Ho use.
Minchener, A. J. , J. Gale, M. Neimann et a l. ( 1999) ' Evaluation of Flue Gas Desulphurisation
Techn ology For Ch inese Coal-Fired Power Plants', in B. Zhang and W. Fan (eds) 2"" lnt'l
Symposium on CCT, pp. 557- 70. Beijing: China Coa l Industry Publish in g House.
Naughton , B. ( 1992) ' Hierarchy a nd the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in
the Reform Process', in K . Liebertha l and D. Lampton (eds) Bureaucracy, Politics, and
Decision Making Post-Mao China, pp. 245 - 82. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Naughton, B. ( 1995) Gro1ving Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978- 1993. New
York: Ca mbridge University Press.
NE PA , SDPC and SETC (1997) China Trans-Century Green Project: Phase I (1996- 2000) .
Beij ing: C hina Environmen tal Science Press.
NEPA , State Price Bureau, Ministry of Finance and Econom ic and Trade Office of the State
Council ( 1992) 'Notice o n Collectin g Po llution Charges on Sulphur Dioxide from Industrial
Fuel Coa l on a Trial Basis'. Beijing: NEPA (14 September).
Ohshita , S. B. (2003) ' Japa n's Cleane r Coa l Technology Transfer to Chin a: The
Impl ementa ti o n of MITI 's Green Aid Pl an' . PhD dissertation, Stanford University.
Ohshi ta , S. B. and Y. Lu (eds) (1996) Economic Gro111rh, Energy Use and Environmental Issues.
Beijing: C hina Environmenta l Science Press.
Ohshit a, S. B. a nd L. Ort ola no (I 999) ' In centives a nd Barriers to Clean Coa l Techn ology
Diffusio n in Chinese Enterprises', in B. Zhang and W. Fan (eds) 2"" lnr'l Symposium on
CCT, pp. 105 - 11 6. Beijing: Ch ina Coa l Industry Publishing Ho use.
Ohshita. S. B. a nd L. Orto la no (2002) 'The Promise and Pitfall s of Japanese Clea ner Coal
Techn o logy Tra nsfer to C hin a', lnternarional Journal of Technology Tran sfer and
Commercialisation I ( 1/2): 56 - 8 1.
Oi, J. (1999) Rural China Takes Off: lnsriturional Foundarions of Economic Reform . Berkeley,
CA: Uni versi ty of Ca lifornia Press.
Rawsk i, T. ( 1994) ' Progress Wit ho ut Priva tizatio n: The Reform of C hina's State Industries', in
V. Milor (ed.) Changing Polirical Economies, pp. 27- 52. Bo ul der, CO: Lyn ne Ri en ner
Publishers.

Cleaner Coal Technology in China

95

SEPA (1998a) 'Notice Concern in g the Work of Closi ng, Banning and Stopping Production at
the 15 Types of Seriously Pollution Enterprises in 1998'. Beijing: SEPA (20 May).
SEPA (1998b) ' Division on the Controlled Regions of Acid Precipitation and S0 2 Pollution',
Huanjing Baohu 3: 7- 10.
SEPA (2000) 'Notice Concern ing Implemen tation of the Expanded Pilot S0 2 Discha rge Fee
Collection.' SEPA [2000] 75 (30 March). Beijing: SEPA.
SEPA, SDPC, Ministry of Finance and SETC ( 1998) ' Notice Concerning Expansion of Pilot
Locations for S0 2 Discha rge Fee Collection in the Acid Rain Control Zones and the SO,
Con trol Zones' . SEPA [1 998]6 (6 April). Beij ing: SEPA.
Sink ule, B. and L. Ortolano ( 1995) Implementing Environmental Policy in China. Westport, CT:
Praeger.
Sinto n, J. and D. Fridley (2000) ' What Goes Up: Recent Trends in China's Energy
Consumption', Energy Policy 28( 10): 67 1- 87.
Smil, V. ( 1989) Energy in China's Modernization: Advances and Limitations. New York: M. E.
Sharpe.
Smil, V. (1998) 'China's Energy and Resource Uses: Continuity and Change', in R. Edmonds
(ed.) Managing the Chinese Environment, pp. 211 - 27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
State Council (1982) ' Method of Levying Pollution Discha rge Fees' . Beijing: State Co uncil
(5 February).
State Council (1988) ' Provisiona l Method for Issuing Loans from Polluti on Sources Treatment
Fund' . Beijing: State Counci l (28 July).
State Council ( 1996) ' Decisions of the State Council on Certain Environmental Protection
Problems'. Beijing: State Council (3 August).
State Co uncil (1998) 'State Cou nci l Approval of Matters Concerning the Acid Rain and SO,
Control Zones'. Beijing: State Council (12 January).
State Price Burea u and Ministry of Finance ( 1992) ' Notice Concerning Environmental
Administration's Administrative Fee Collection Programme and Standards' . Beijing: SPB
and Ministry of Finance (20 April).
Thomson, E. (1996) 'Reforming China's Coal Industry', China Quarterly 147: 726- 51.
US Embassy Beijing (2000) 'PRC Planners' New Energy Strategy: Oil Not Coal' . (February).
Available online: http://www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/sdpcenergy.html.
Vermeer, E. B. (1998) ' Industri al Pollution in China and Remed ial Policies', China Quarterly
156: 952- 85.
Walder, A. (1992) 'Local Bargain in g Relationships and Urba n Industrial Finance', in K.
Lieberthal and D. Lampton (eds) Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making Post-Mao
China, pp. 308- 33. Berkeley, CA: U niversity of Ca lifornia Press.
Wang, S. (1995) ' Fiscal Reform and the Decli ne of Centra l State Capacity in C hin a', in A.
Walder (ed.) The Waning of the Communist State: Origins of Political Decline in China and
Hungary, pp. 87- 11 3. Berkeley, CA: U niversity of California Press.
Watson , J. (2002) 'Cleaner Coal Technology Transfer to China: A " Win- Win" Opportunity for
Sustainable Development?', International Journal of Techno logy Transfer and
Commercialisation 1(4): 347- 72.
Wo rld Bank ( 1997) Clear Water. Blue Skies: China's Environment in the New Cent ury.
Wa shington, DC: The World Bank.
Xinhua News Agency (2002) 'China ' s Coal Indu stry on Way to Recovery'. Xinhua News
Agency (24 January).
Zhu, D. and Z . Yu ( 1999) ' Market Analysis of Clean Coal Technologies in China', in B. Zhang
a nd W. Fan (eds) 2"" tnt'/ Symposium on CCT, pp. 10 - 25. Beijing: China Coa l Industry
Publishing House.

